
United Kingdom
Competition Law and Climate Change

This section was last reviewed in February 2024.
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Executive summary
Addressing climate change will require significant changes in many different industries. To ensure action occurs at a large scale, and that some businesses do not suffer from acting on climate before others, competitors in many sectors are taking coordinated action to reduce their emissions. These collaborations and initiatives are necessary to drive climate action in the private sector, but may raise competition law concerns.
While competition law is often treated as an obstacle to collaboration between companies that aim to promote sustainable development,[1] it need not be part of the problem and can instead be part of the solution.[2] Indeed, competition law can be a driver of green innovation and sustainability, ensuring that resources are allocated efficiently. Although at times competition and climate change objectives may conflict, regulations can help address circumstances where these two goals are at odds. In recent years, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has provided guidance to businesses in relation to climate change and the environment, which is a step towards ensuring competition law is not an obstacle to climate goals.
- Businesses that agree to collaborate on climate change may fall foul of antitrust rules if these collaborations distort competition, but can consult CMA guidance to ensure that these agreements are structured in accordance with the law.
- Competition law helps to ensure that mergers between businesses working on sustainability improve efficiency and scale up the deployment of green goods and services, rather than reduce competition and innovation.
- The CMA has launched studies evaluating the competitiveness of various green industries including electric vehicles and how this impacts consumers, and has advocated for stronger consumer protection laws to avoid companies ‘greenwashing’ by making misleading environmental claims.
- Pursuant to the introduction of the 2023 Green Agreements Guidance, businesses that wish to collaborate with competitors on sustainability efforts would need to determine whether the agreement is an environmental sustainability agreement, climate change agreement, or mixed agreement.
- Business stakeholders have the opportunity to engage with the CMA on competition issues through its Sustainability Taskforce, and may play a role in shaping legislation to embed climate change considerations in relevant laws.
How climate change is impacting competition law
Climate change has been on the agenda of the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) since 2020. In the recent 2024/2025 Annual Plan, the CMA has included a focus on net zero transition and has pledged to broaden its presence in green claims work while encouraging competitive markets for climate technology. Furthermore, the CMA released its 2023 Green Agreements Guidance “2023 Guidance”, which explains the application of the competition rules outlined in the Chapter 1 prohibition of the Competition Act 1998 to agreements relating to environmental sustainability between competitors. In defining the legality of different types of environmental sustainability agreements, the 2023 Guidance indicates the CMA’s intent to support businesses taking climate change and sustainability collaboration without fear of breaching competition law. It includes extensive examples of types of agreements that are unlikely to infringe competition law, those that could infringe competition rules, as well as those that may benefit from an exemption. Businesses that are unsure whether certain agreements could benefit from an exemption are encouraged to discuss with the CMA regarding the potential for exemption. It should, however, be noted that the Guidance applies only to the UK; companies with overseas operations would need to observe the guidelines in other jurisdictions.
Similarly, the OECD Secretariat published a background paper in December 2021, outlining areas of both potential compatibility and conflict between competition and environmental protection.[3] The Secretariat outlined four scenarios that may arise: i) conduct or merger that is anti-competitive and harmful to the environment, ii) conduct or merger that is pro-competitive and beneficial to the environment iii) conduct or merger that is anti-competitive but beneficial for the environment, and iv) conduct or merger that is pro-competitive and harmful to the environment.[4]
This section will look at how antitrust, the mergers and markets regime, and the consumer regime intersect with climate and how each is presently compatible or in conflict with climate change and the environment.
Chapter I Prohibition: Compatible and Anticompetitive Agreements
The current legal framework is set out in the Competition Act 1998 (CA98) which prohibits “agreements which prevent, restrict or distort competition” (Chapter I, CA98), and “conduct which constitutes an abuse of a dominant position” (Chapter II, CA98). The Act is implemented and enforced by the CMA. Despite an existing regulatory framework, a survey commissioned by Linklaters in 2023 reveals that 60% of the respondent were reluctant to collaborate on sustainability issues due to fear of breaking competition rules.[5] Lack of clarity can be a significant impediment as there are various situations in which competition law and environmental protection can conflict or be compatible. Awareness of each situation is crucial for effective work and collaboration between businesses.
This section focuses on Chapter I of CA98, which prohibits agreements, decisions, and practices that prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the U.K. Compatible agreements can include voluntarily setting common objectives, such as an intention to reduce CO2 emissions without binding specific contributions of each participant.[6] Such agreements are straightforward and normally present no challenges as they pose no harm to competition or climate objectives. Pursuant to the 2023 Guidance, these agreements either (1) do not relate to the way businesses compete, or (2) do not appreciably affect competition. The latter could be because the parties’ combined market share is too small, or the agreement merely concerns the pooling of information about the environmental credentials of a supplier, the creation of industry standards and environmental targets or the phasing-out of non-sustainable products.
Under compatible agreements, it is useful to distinguish “environmental sustainability agreements”, “climate change agreements”, and “mixed agreements” in accordance with the 2023 Guidance. “Environmental sustainability agreements” refers to agreements between competitors that are aimed at preventing, reducing, or mitigating the adverse impact that economic activities have on the environment, or assisting with the transition towards environmental sustainability. “Climate change agreements” presents a subset of environmental sustainability agreements that focus on combatting or mitigating climate change. “Mixed agreements”, which generates both climate change and other e environmental benefits, fall into the middle ground.
By contrast, examples of anticompetitive agreements linked to climate change include establishing greenwashing cartels where companies use sustainability claims to mask anticompetitive intentions or anticompetitive agreements which disincentivise investment in recycling, green innovation, or waste reduction.[7] For instance, in the Car Emissions case, the European Commission fined car manufacturers (Daimler, BMW, Volkswagen, Audi and Porche) €875 million for colluding to restrict competition in “emission cleaning for new diesel passenger cars”.[8] Anticompetitive agreements are in the centre of litigations that concern greenwashing cartels are steadily increasing in the U.S, especially in the fossil fuel industry. An example is People v Exxon Mobil Corp., in which the California Attorney General filed a lawsuit against 13 fossil fuel companies and the American Petroleum Institute for engaging in unfair competition and accelerating climate change by concealing the danger of their products to the environment deliberately.
While some agreements may appear to be anticompetitive, they may attract an exemption if they generate environmental benefits that are advantageous to consumers and such benefits outweigh competition related concerns. The 2023 Guidance outlines several examples of anticompetitive agreements that may qualify for exemption, which includes collective withdrawal agreements to only purchase from suppliers that sell sustainable products, agreements jointly to buy sustainable inputs, agreements to phase out unsustainable or high-carbon-emitting production processes, and agreements not to provide products or services to customers that produce environmentally damaging products or services.
Businesses may refer to the way the CMA assessed the WWF-UK proposal, which was released in March 2024. Here five U.K. supermarkets had pledged to ask suppliers that represent 50% of their individual purchased goods and services to publish net zero targets and establish clear milestones to enable a 50% reduction in emissions by 2030. The WWF-UK proposal purports to increase the coverage of suppliers from 50% to 80% to accelerate the net zero transition on food systems. A few points may be picked up from the CMA’s assessment. First, the CMA categorised the proposal as a “Climate Change Agreement” that would benefit U.K. consumers because the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions could “mitigate the impacts of climate change, which would in turn help to reduce consumers’ costs”. In weighing the potential anticompetitive effects against the benefits, the CMA presented robust data that included high-level estimates of Scope 3 emissions and the carbon value of estimated reductions. Second, the CMA concluded that the WWF-UK proposal amounts to a phasing-out agreement, which would unlikely restrict competition nor lead to market-sharing.
Chapter II Prohibition: Abuse of Dominance
Having explored compatible agreements and anticompetitive agreements that could benefit from exemptions, the concept of abuse of dominance illustrates the dynamic interaction between competition law and climate change. Chapter II of CA98 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in market that could affect trade within the U.K. On one hand, abuse of dominance could be associated with environmental damage in various forms. First, a dominant company may engage in an exploitative conduct by passing the environmental costs to society and setting unfair prices. In its briefing paper, the OECD Secretariat provides an example of the disposal of chemical products into a river by a dominant firm which creates a competitive advantage over firms that incur additional costs for disposing of waste in accordance with the law.[9]
Second, a dominant company with polluting technology may abuse its dominant position by foreclosing a rival firm with green technology. Green killer acquisitions, albeit relatively uncommon in the UK., have been in the spotlights of other jurisdictions. In October 2022, the European Commission launched an investigation into the merger between Norsk Hydro, a leading supplier of aluminium foundry alloys and Alumetal, a smaller rival that makes the same products, but with the potential to reduce emissions through recycled aluminium. Hence, the European Commission was concerned that the merger would “eliminate a competitor able to bring cheaper and advanced recycled aluminium products to the market”. Although the merger was cleared unconditionally after in-depth investigation, the merger review demonstrates how competition law could protect smaller, green players.
Third, predatory bidding strategies may be used to foreclose green competitors. In March 2021, the European Commission alleged that Public Power Corporation (PPC), a Greek electricity provider, had been supplying electricity generated by its thermal plants at prices below their variable costs. The Commission contended that in the context of the European Green Deal, PPC had slowed down green investments and hinders Greece’s efforts to go green. At the time of writing, the Commission’s view remains such that PPC’s pricing strategy had resulted in the marginalisation of independent power providers which supply environmental-friendly energy sources. On the other hand, some allegations of abuse of dominance may involve environmental benefits. Examples include a dominant company that a) refuses to deal with any trading partner, including a potential one, that does not meet certain environmental criteria that goes above the regulatory standards, b) enters into exclusive long-term arrangements to recover considerable environmental investments, c) engages in “tying and bundling, conditioning the sale” of its products on additional green product purchases, d) operates an e-commerce platform where rivals’ more polluting products are demoted in favour of own greener products.[10]
Apart from the OECD Briefing Paper, additional guidance could be found in the CMA’s Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy. The CMA put forward four potential scenarios where sustainability agreements may invoke abuse of dominance concerns, namely when a business in market power changes its pricing policies due to a sustainability initiative to incentivise customers to purchase more sustainable products, seeks to recoup environmental costs through entering long-term exclusive arrangements, change the sales terms of a product in connection with a sustainability initiative, or refuses to enter business with a seller or supplier due to a sustainability agreement.[11] Nevertheless, a conduct may fall outside of Chapter II CA98 prohibition, provided that the business could demonstrate that it is objectively ‘justified’ and ‘proportionate’.[12] However, the evaluation process may be challenging, given that the conduct may be examined on a case-by-case basis.[13]
Exemptions and Sustainability Agreements
There has been much contention around the potential conflicts between the prohibitions under Chapter 1 CA98 (agreements), Chapter II CA98 (abuse of dominant position), and environmental sustainability. This was addressed by the CMA in its Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, which identified the tensions where agreements to phase out certain products and technologies lead to a collective boycott. Another situation that may restrict competition is where the competitors impose industry-wide standards and exchange sensitive information. While the onus remains on businesses to navigate the tipping point at which an agreement or a conduct would be considered anticompetitive, the 2023 Guidance has introduced significant clarity. It should be noted that the 2023 Guidance supplements and should be read together with the CMA Guidance on Horizontal Agreements.
As a starting point, agreements may qualify for either a block or individual exemption if they meet the conditions under section 9 CA98. Recall that the 2023 Guidance distinguishes between environmental sustainability agreements and climate change agreements. The following paragraphs shall analyse how the conditions are to be applied in light of the 2023 Guidance. Under section 6 CA98, the Secretary of State may make a block exemption order that exempts certain agreements from the Chapter I prohibition. The purpose of section 6 CA98 is to reduce the burden of compliance. It allows businesses to have the confidence that, if the agreement meets the conditions of the block exemption, there would be no need to scrutinise the agreement against each of the conditions under section 9 CA98. Examples of such agreements (agreements not to provide products or services that produce environmental damage etc.) have been explored above, but in terms of substance, they typically contain restrictions on the maximum market share, as per the Specialisation Agreements Block Exemption Order (SABEO). In situations where a block exemption is not appropriate, individual exemptions may be granted provided the agreement meets the criteria set out in section 9 Chapter I CA98.[14]
Regarding the exemption conditions under section 9 CA98 conditions, for environmental sustainability agreements, first, the agreement must result in objective benefits to production, distribution or technical or economic progress. Objective benefits, according to the 2023 Guidance, may include (1) eliminating or reducing harmful greenhouse gas emissions that arose from the production or consumption of particular goods or services, (2) improving product variety or quality, such as products with a reduced impact on the environment, (3) reducing production or distribution costs for sustainable products through combining resources to achieve economies of scale, (4) shortening the time to bring environmentally sustainable products to market, and (5) increasing innovation through introducing more energy efficient processes. Second, the agreement must be indispensable. An agreement may be deemed indispensable if the sustainability goal in question could not be achieved through other less restrictive, less coordinated approaches.
Third, consumers must receive a fair share of the benefits. The broad consensus is that if an agreement that restricts competition results in environmental benefits to a ‘broader group of consumers than just those adversely affected by the restriction of competition’, then such benefit, at least in principle, can be part of the ‘fair share’ assessment in line with Section 9 CA98.[15] In light of Sainsbury’s Supermarkets v Mastercard, the benefits must also accrue to the consumers that suffer from the restriction in competition.[16] The CMA suggests that, under the ‘fair share’ assessment, the benefits to one group of consumers could not offset net harm to a different group of consumers unless sufficient benefit accrued to the harmed consumers.[17] Fourth, the agreement must not substantially eliminate competition. Environmental sustainability agreements should not hinder businesses from competing on main parameters, such as price and quality.
Where climate change or mixed agreements are concerned, the CMA takes a more flexible approach to applying the 2023 Guidance. In applying the third exemption condition, the consumers do not need to be specific to the market under assessment, as long as the benefits accrue to all U.K. consumers. If the agreements result in a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions outside of the U.K., U.K. consumers would be presumed to have benefitted from the agreement. Nevertheless, businesses would need to demonstrate that the benefits at least meet existing, quantifiable targets, such as the goal set out by the Paris Agreement.
Finally, under the current framework, the government can disapply the Chapter I prohibition in line with Schedule 3 CA98 where the minister deems it ‘appropriate’ to “avoid a conflict between [UK competition law] and an international obligation of the UK”. The Paris Agreement is one such example of an international obligation.[18] There may be exceptional circumstances, therefore, where an exclusion will be sought after or granted in line with this provision.
Although no specific issues relating to environment or climate have been found in relation to vertical agreements, it is possible that issues may arise regarding ‘foreclosure of suppliers, softening of competition and facilitation of collusion.’[19] The OECD provides an example of manufacturers or suppliers imposing minimum sales prices on resellers in an attempt to subsidise or protect investments into their products’ higher environmental standards. The CMA published its guidelines on vertical agreements in June 2022[20] and published guidelines for horizontal cooperation in August 2023. The new UK rules for vertical agreements (VABEO) have now replaced the European Commission’s 2010 Vertical Agreements Block Exemptions Regulation (VABR).[21]
Mergers regime
In 2018, the Spanish energy and petrochemical company Repsol acquired Viesgo’s low-emission business and entered the green electricity generation market while cementing its transition into cleaner energy markets.[22] While merger reviews in Europe demonstrate greater focus on sustainability factors, given growing attention to sustainability, we are likely to see similar mergers and acquisitions, including in the UK, where climate and environmental considerations will be the key driver.[23] As with antitrust, there are areas where competition law can inevitably find itself in conflict with climate change and environmental protection, although there are equally areas of compatibility.
One example of a conflict is a merger that leads to an increase in market power and results in higher prices, lower quality of green products and less green innovation. A merger may also result in an increase in buyer power which in turn may enable a company to lower the prices at which it purchases certain products or materials. This can disincentivise investment into such products due to an expected decrease in revenues.[24] Furthermore, mergers that unilaterally affect the amount and pace of innovation through path dependency may lead to a loss in the future green competition.[25] In Dow/Dupont, the European Commission found that the two companies were close R&D competitors, and a merger may result in the discontinuation of overlapping innovation efforts. Since rivals were not deemed likely to counteract such effects, the clearance was conditional on “R&D asset divestiture remedies”.[26] Similarly, in KPS Capital Partners/Real Alloy Europe, the risk that the proposed merger may foreclose critical input for recycled aluminium was the European Commission’s primary concerns.
A potential scenario that may arise is an decrease in price due to a buyer acquiring a close competitor where each party has complementary technologies and know-how that in the long run can lead to significant green innovation.[27] In such a case, the regulator would consider green efficiencies. This is evident in the revised Merger Assessment Guidelines published by the CMA in March 2021, in which reduced carbon emissions and sustainability are acknowledged as merger efficiencies. The CMA recognises environmental sustainability and support for a low carbon economy transition as potential efficiencies, although it stresses that facts of individual cases are important in the assessment.[28]
When investigating mergers between enterprises in the UK, the CMA may opt to not find a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) in a merger in cases where rivalry-enhancing efficiencies, for instance, environmental benefits, are outweighed by anticompetitive effects.[29] Similarly, there may be ‘relevant customer benefits’ (RCBs) that although lead to an SLC, the CMA may opt to consider remedies that preserve RCBs or may decide that RCBs outweigh adverse SLC effects and no referral to an in-depth review phase is needed. These approaches would allow the CMA to prevent competition law from undermining sustainability efforts, especially when businesses that wish to embrace green transition are already facing issues such as the first mover disadvantage (being the first to switch to a more sustainable, but more costly input), the lack of capabilities, resources, and scale, and unhelpful duplication.
The CMA has identified three key areas where the UK’s net zero and sustainability goals may influence the mergers. Firms directly involved in climate-related activities may merge and lessen competition in this area. Alternatively, mergers may enhance efficiency, for example by creating more efficient sustainable production processes. A merger may also result in RCBs that support the net zero transition.[30]
The CMA recognises, however, that quantifying efficiency or RCB relating to environmental sustainability may be challenging or even infeasible.[31] Moreover, weighing up exercises may involve value judgments between sustainability and competition outcomes.[32] There is no established framework to render value judgments in relation to environmental sustainability, and there is no independent body that the CMA could consult in this regard. Finally, it may further be challenging to see a claimed environmental benefit if a firm argues that the merger is needed to scale and scope its operations to achieve green objectives. The CMA would have to be satisfied that no other less anti-competitive alternative is available.[33]
It is important to note that under section 58 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02) the Secretary of State can intervene in mergers cases on grounds of public interest, but environmental considerations would need to be specified as a public interest consideration.[34]
Markets regime
The CMA has the power to carry out market studies and investigation references (MIRs) and can implement a number of remedies accordingly.[35] Such tools are set out in the Enterprise Act (EA02) (amended by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013).[36] The key goal of such tools is to examine and remedy any economic harms that arise to consumers because of poor competition. The CMA considers that under the current markets regime it can take into account environmental sustainability if it implicates harm to consumers.[37]
In 2020, the CMA launched a market study into electric vehicle charging and has considered launching a CA98 investigation into ‘long-term exclusivity arrangements for charging along motorways’ among others.[38] Some note that MIRs may be one of the most flexible tools in the CMA’s toolbox to determine appropriate course of action since CMA can make orders, accept undertakings, as well as use its consumer protection powers and make recommendations for remedial action to the government, regulators or other public authorities.[39] The CMA is considering strengthening the markets regime by increasing the speed and effectiveness of its market tools, especially in the context of fast-paced developing environmental and sustainability markets.[40]
Consumer regime
As part of its consumer protection role, the CMA has been dedicating attention to addressing and preventing misleading environmental claims by companies. In September 2021, the CMA published specific guidance to help businesses comply with the relevant obligations with regards to environmental claims.[41] Although green claims provisions are mostly aimed at preventing misleading claims that could lead to erosion of consumers’ trust, it is also a signal that the CMA will aim to ensure a level playing field by protecting businesses from unfair competition.[42] The CMA global review found that 40% of firms’ green claims may be misleading.[43] It began carrying out a review of misleading green claims in early 2022, starting with the fashion sector.[44] In March 2024, the CMA secured undertakings from ASOS, Boohoo, and George at Asda to use only accurate and clear green claims. This includes displaying the percentage of recycled or organic fibres and only using terms such as “organic”, “responsible”, or “sustainable” when certain criteria are met. Businesses in the fashion sector should refer to the CMA’s Open Letter to ensure compliance with the Green Claims Code.
There are several potential challenges under the current regime. For instance, at the moment, there is no standard definition of environmental terms such as ‘biodegradable’, compostable, ‘carbon neutral’, ‘carbon negative’, and ‘net zero’. The CMA recognises, however, that definitions would promote product comparability and help consumers make informed decisions, as well as create a level playing field for businesses.[45] Moreover, while at present there is an obligation further down the supply chain to not mislead businesses to whom goods and services are sold, there is no positive obligation to disclose information.[46] Finally, while it is currently entirely legitimate to employ marketing tools that aim to increase consumption, such practices may be re-examined should the UK try to shift its patterns of consumption in order to meet sustainability goals.[47] The CMA has recommended that the UK introduce changes to the existing consumer law and implement the following: “i) Disclosure of environmental sustainability information ii) Supply chain transparency, iii) Changes to the list of banned practices under consumer law to deter use and support enforcement of misleading and unsubstantiated environmental claims, iv) Strengthening the CMA’s enforcement powers and refocusing consumer law to support sustainable consumption”.[48]
How competition law can help to address climate change
Competition law can be a driver of the fight against climate change in many ways. Investing in green initiatives can secure companies a competitive advantage, cut their costs, increase their market shares and spur innovation.[49] At the same time, competition regulations may improve product quality, choice of more sustainable products, and stimulate green innovation while addressing market failures.[50]
Self-imposed targets by businesses and individuals are influential, however, the consensus is that ambitious goals require cooperation among companies including joining assets and know-how via mergers and joint ventures.[51] As such, robust legal frameworks are crucial as is clarity when it comes to weighing in when any such cooperation is within the permitted boundaries. Ultimately, in addition to ensuring that it does not create significant barriers to the net zero transition, competition law can help to avoid anticompetitive practices that may negatively impact climate efforts, and facilitate cooperation between businesses on climate change.
The CMA has already produced relevant guidance that can help firms navigate the risks and opportunities in this area, and will likely continue to do so. More initiatives are being further launched by CMA. In 2022, CMA launched a Sustainability Taskforce to lead the efforts in supporting the UK’s transition to a low carbon economy.[52] Its tasks include engaging with the relevant stakeholders, partner organisations and the government as well as develop formal sustainability guidance across CMA’s functions, periodically review cases for legislative change and similar.[53] Market studies as carried out by the CMA are and will continue to be a crucial tool in analysing the entire market, making effective recommendations to the government and implementing needed remedies.
Future reforms may involve more directly integrating climate change into CMA decision making, as has been proposed for other regulators. While some judicial reviews aiming to hold the government to account on climate commitments have succeeded, scholars note there is nothing to suggest this trend may spill over into competition law.[54] To that end, some have proposed specifying “climate change and sustainability” as a public interest under Sections 58 and 153 of EA02.[55] These steps would fall in line with the broader trend of integrating climate change across all government bodies explored in other sections of this resource.
[1] Wolftheiss. What Role Can Competition Law play in tackling climate change? 15 July 2020, link.
[2] Holmes, pp. 355 (Ref: Holmes, Simon. “Climate change, sustainability, and competition law.” Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 8, no. 2 (2020): 354-405.)
[3] Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat link. 1 December 2021.
[4] Ibid., para 97.
[5] See Competition law clarity needed to encourage sustainable business practices OUT-LAW ANALYSIS, 10 Dec 2020 link.
[6] OECD 2021, para 100 (Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat link. 1 December 2021).
[7] Ibid. para 101.
[8] European Commission, Press release, July 2021, link.
[9] Dolmans and Mostyn, 2021 in OECD 2021, para 140 link.
[10] OECD 2021, para 143, link.
[11] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs, link, para 20.
[12] Ibid. para 24.
[13] Ibid.
[14] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs, link, para 21.
[15] CMA (2022). Environmental sustainability and the UK competition and consumer regimes: CMA advice to the Government Published 14 March 2022 link.
[16] See Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd and others v Mastercard Incorporated and others, [2002] UKSC 24.
[17] CMA (2022). Environmental sustainability and the UK competition and consumer regimes: CMA advice to the Government Published 14 March 2022 link.
[18] Holmes, section 3.d, Working paper – CCLP(L)51 Climate Change, Sustainability and Competition Law in the UK Simon Holmes1 (Oxford).
[19] See OECD 2021, para 126.
[20] See CMA’s Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Order, 12 July 2022, link.
[21] Squire Patton Boggs, New EU and UK Rules for Vertical Agreements Come Into Effect 1 June 2022 Summary of Key Changes EMEA – 1 June 2022 link.
[22] Repsol. “Reposol Buys Viesgo’s Low-Emissions Assets and Retail Business for 750 Million Euros”. 27 June 2018. link.
[23] OECD, para 148. link. Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat 1 December 2021.
[24] See 2020 Arubis/Metallo case where the EC approved the acquisition by Arubis having considered mentioned concerns.
[25] OECD, para 162. link. Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat. 1 December 2021.
[26] OECD, Ibid. para 166.
[27] OECD, Ibid. para 171.
[28] CMA, Merger Assessment Guidelines, 18 March 2021 link.
[29] Ibid. para 30.
[30] Ibid. para 33-35.
[31] Ibid. para 36.
[32] Ibid. para 37.
[33] Ibid. para 32.
[34] CMA, Environmental sustainability and the UK competition and consumer regimes: CMA advice to the Government Published 14 March 2022, link.
[35] Holmes, section 3.d, Working paper – CCLP(L)51 Climate Change, Sustainability and Competition Law in the UK Simon Holmes1 (Oxford).
[36] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs, link. Para 71.
[37] Ibid. 79.
[38] Ibid. para 77-78.
[39] Holmes, section 3.d, Working paper – CCLP(L)51 Climate Change, Sustainability and Competition Law in the UK Simon Holmes1 (Oxford).
[40] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs, link. Para 80.
[41] CMA guidance on environmental claims on goods and services: Helping businesses comply with their consumer protection law obligations, 20 September 2021, CMA 146 link.
[42] Malinauskaite 2022, pp 348. Source: Jurgita Malinauskaite, Competition Law and Sustainability: EU and National Perspectives, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 13, Issue 5, July 2022, Pages 336–348, link.
[43] link. Press release. Jan 2021.
[44] CMA Annual Plan 2022-2023 link.
[45] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs, link. para 53.
[46] Ibid. para 58.
[47] Ibid. para 68-69.
[48] CMA 2022, link. Correspondence Environmental sustainability and the UK competition and consumer regimes: CMA advice to the Government Published 14 March 2022.
[49] OECD. link. Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat 1 December 2021.
[50] Ibid. para 21.
[51] ICC, 2020; Holmes, 2020; Dolmans, 2020; Unilever, 2020 in OECD 2021 (link. Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat 1 December 2021).
[52] CMA “CMA publishes environmental sustainability advice to government”, Press Release, 14 March 2022, link.
[53] CMA. link. Correspondence Environmental sustainability and the UK competition and consumer regimes: CMA advice to the Government Published 14 March 2022.
[54] ICC, 2020; Holmes, 2020; Dolmans, 2020; Unilever, 2020 in OECD 2021 (link. Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat 1 December 2021).
[55] Ibid. section 7.