United Kingdom

Competition Law and Climate Change

Executive summary

Addressing climate change will require significant changes in many different industries. To ensure action occurs at a large scale, and that some businesses do not suffer from acting on climate before others, competitors in many sectors are taking coordinated action to reduce their emissions. These collaborations and initiatives are necessary to drive climate action in the private sector, but may raise competition law concerns.

While competition law is often treated as an obstacle to collaboration between companies that aim to promote sustainable development,[1] it need not be part of the problem and can instead be part of the solution.[2] Indeed, competition law can be a driver of green innovation and sustainability, ensuring that resources are allocated efficiently. Although at times competition and climate change objectives may conflict, regulations can help address circumstances where these two goals are at odds. In recent years, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has provided guidance to businesses in relation to climate change and the environment, which is a step towards ensuring competition law is not an obstacle to climate goals.  

How climate change is impacting competition law 

Since 2020, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has included climate change into its annual plan and has pledged to support the transition to a low carbon economy by making sure “businesses engaged in sustainability initiatives know how to comply with competition law and do not unnecessarily shy away from those initiatives on the basis of unfounded fears of being in breach of competition law”.[3] The CMA has published a series of advice and consultations, as well as pledged to prioritise cases that could be an impediment to transition to a low carbon economy and vowed to encourage “healthy markets in sustainable products and services” in its 2022-2023 plan.[4] Importantly, the CMA has offered guidance to the government regarding antitrust, mergers, markets, and consumer regimes.Further, in its 2023 Green Agreements Guidance, the authority explains the application of the competition rules outlined in the Chapter 1 prohibition of the Competition Act 1998 to agreements relating to environmental sustainability between competitors. In defining the legality of different types of environmental sustainability agreements, this guidance indicates CMA’s intent to support businesses taking climate change and sustainability collaboration without fear of breaching competition law. The guidance includes extensive examples of types of agreements that are unlikely to infringe competition law, those that could infringe competition rules, as well as those that may benefit from an exemption.

The OECD Secretariat published a background paper in December 2021, outlining areas of both potential compatibility and conflict between competition and environmental protection.[5] In it, the Secretariat outlined four scenarios that may arise: i) conduct or merger that is anti-competitive and harmful to the environment, ii) conduct or merger that is pro-competitive and beneficial to the environment iii) conduct or merger that is anti-competitive but beneficial for the environment, and iv) conduct or merger that is pro-competitive and harmful to the environment.[6]

This section will look at how antitrust, the mergers and markets regime, and the consumer regime intersect with climate and how each is presently compatible or in conflict with climate change and the environment.

Antitrust rules

The current legal framework is set out in the Competition Act 1998 (CA98) which prohibits “agreements which prevent, restrict or distort competition” (Chapter I, CA98), and “conduct which constitutes an abuse of a dominant position” (Chapter II, CA98). The act is implemented and enforced by the CMA. Despite an existing regulatory framework, a 2020 Pinsent Masons survey revealed that 72% of the participants “wanted more explicit guidance as to what is and is not permissible from a competition law perspective”.[7] Lack of clarity can be a significant impediment as there are various situations in which competition law and environmental protection can conflict or be compatible. Awareness of each situation is crucial for effective work and collaboration between businesses.

Compatible agreements can include voluntarily setting common objectives, such as an intention to reduce CO₂ emissions without binding specific contributions of each participant.[8] Such agreements are straightforward and normally present no challenges as they pose no harm to competition or climate objectives. Examples of anticompetitive agreements linked to climate change include establishing greenwashing cartels where companies use sustainability claims to mask anticompetitive intentions or anticompetitive agreements which disincentivise investment in recycling, green innovation, or waste reduction.[9] For instance, in the Car Emissions case, the European Commission fined car manufacturers (Daimler, BMW, Volkswagen, Audi and Porche) €875 million for colluding to restrict competition in “emission cleaning for new diesel passenger cars”.[10]

While some agreements may appear to be anticompetitive, they may attract an exemption if they generate environmental benefits that are advantageous to consumers and such benefits outweigh competition related concerns. In its 2021 Background paper, the OECD outlined several examples of anticompetitive agreements that can have a positive effect on the environment: a) horizontal cooperation to bind participants to a more stringent environmental standard than the established legal one i.e. environmental standardisation or sustainability agreements,[11] b) horizontal co-operation to phase out a less environmentally-friendly type of product,[12] c) horizontal cooperation to set joint schemes and sharing of infrastructures for an environmental goal,[13] and d) vertical agreements.

In its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, the OECD covers all key areas of business responsibility, providing recommendations for responsible conduct and implementation procedures for National Contact Points (NCPs) for Responsible Business Conduct. NCPs are government agencies established to handle due diligence and cases as a non-judicial grievance mechanism—all 51 governments adhering to OECD Guidelines are legally obliged to have an NCP. In 2020 Global Witness, a charity, filed a ‘specific instance’ before the UK NCP for the OECD Guidelines against the Government’s export credit agency, UK Export Finance (UKEF), arguing that it was in breach of various chapters of the Guidelines by failing to contribute Paris agreements goals. Although the complaint was rejected on the basis that UK Export Finance was not a multinational enterprise, it points to evolving understandings of climate responsibility across industries with cross-cutting impacts, such as insurance.  

Another type of anticompetitive conduct includes abuse of dominance which can be associated with environmental damage. In its briefing paper, the OECD Secretariat provides an example of the disposal of chemical products into a river by a dominant firm which creates a competitive advantage over firms that incur additional costs for disposing of waste in accordance with the law.[14]

Some examples of abuse of dominance that may have environmental benefits include a dominant company that a) refuses to deal with any trading partner, including a potential one, that does not meet certain environmental criteria that goes above the regulatory standards, b) enters into exclusive long-term arrangements to recover considerable environmental investments, c) engages in “tying and bundling, conditioning the sale” of its products on additional green product purchases, d) operates an e-commerce platform where rivals’ more polluting products are demoted in favour of own greener products.[15]

Sustainability agreements

Two key areas are worth examining – potential conflicts between Chapter I CA98 prohibitions and environmental sustainability agreements, and between Chapter II CA98 prohibitions and sustainability agreements.

In 2021, the CMA published its guidance on environmental sustainability agreements and competition law which aims to assist businesses in considering how their sustainability agreements may comply with the provisions set out in Chapter I CA98.[16] The CMA identified that tensions may arise between sustainability and competition when competitors agree to phase out certain products or technologies, which could amount to a collective boycott. [17] It also warns that imposing industry-wide standards and exchanging sensitive information on sustainability might equate to restrictions on competition. Further anticompetitive behaviour might involve agreeing to invest in certain technologies or creating a common roadmap for the use of certain materials.

Importantly, the CMA recognises that in some circumstances agreements that restrict competition may be afforded a block or individual exemption under Chapter I 98CA. Sustainability agreements such as R&D or specialisation agreements may be exempt from the prohibition under the block exemption subject to conditions set out by the CMA, which include, among others, specific restrictions that should not be contained within the agreement, and maximum market share requirements.[18] In situations where a block exemption is not appropriate, individual exemptions may be granted provided the agreement meets the criteria set out in Section 9, Chapter I CA98.[19]

Concerns have been raised regarding how the relevant environmental benefits may be identified and weighed against competition issues.[20] The CMA intends to put forward further guidance and offer more clarity on what will constitute ‘benefits’ under section 9 CA98 and a ‘fair share’ of benefits for consumers.[21] In the meantime, the CMA posits that if an agreement that restricts competition results in environmental benefits to a ‘broader group of consumers than just those adversely affected by the restriction of competition’, then such benefit, at least in principle, can be part of the ‘fair share’ assessment in line with Section 9 CA98.[22] However, in light of Sainsbury’s Supermarkets v Mastercard , the benefits must also accrue to the consumers that suffer from the restriction in competition.[23] The CMA suggests that, under the ‘fair share’ assessment, the benefits to one group of consumers could not offset net harm to a different group of consumers unless sufficient benefit accrued to the harmed consumers.[24] 

The CMA has further offered guidance on sustainability agreements that may be in conflict with Chapter II CA 98 prohibition involving abuse of power. The CMA has put forward four potential scenarios where this may be the case, namely when a business might: change its pricing policies due to a sustainability initiative; seek to recoup environmental costs through entering long-term exclusive arrangements; change the sales terms of a product in connection with a sustainability initiative; or refuse to enter business with a seller or supplier due to a sustainability agreement.[25]

In some circumstances conduct may fall outside of Chapter II CA98 prohibition when a business engages in sustainability initiative provided it can demonstrate that their conduct is objectively ‘justified’ and ‘proportionate’.[26] However, as with the Section 9 exemption, the evaluation process may be challenging, and conduct may be examined on a case-by-case basis.[27]

Finally, under the current framework, the government can exclude an agreement from the anti-competitive agreements prohibition in line with Schedule 3, CA98 where the minister deems it ‘appropriate’ to “avoid a conflict between [UK competition law] and an international obligation of the UK”. The Paris Agreement is one such example of an international obligation.[28] There may be exceptional circumstances, therefore, where an exclusion will be sought after or granted in line with this provision. 

Although no specific issues relating to environment or climate have been found in relation to vertical agreements, it is possible that issues may arise regarding ‘foreclosure of suppliers, softening of competition and facilitation of collusion.’[29] The OECD provides an example of manufacturers or suppliers imposing minimum sales prices on resellers in an attempt to subsidise or protect investments into their products’ higher environmental standards.

The CMA published its guidelines on vertical agreements in June 2022[30] and published guidelines for horizontal cooperation in August 2023. The new UK rules for vertical agreements (VABEO) have now replaced the European Commission’s 2010 Vertical Agreements Block Exemptions Regulation (VABR) (although there is a one-year transition period).[31]

Mergers regime

In 2018, the Spanish energy and petrochemical company Repsol acquired Viesgo’s low-emission business and entered the green electricity generation market while cementing its transition into cleaner energy markets.[32] Given growing attention to sustainability, we are likely to see similar mergers and acquisitions, including in the UK, where climate and environmental considerations will be the key driver.[33] As with antitrust, there are areas where competition law can inevitably find itself in conflict with climate change and environmental protection, although there are equally areas of compatibility.

One example of a conflict is a merger that leads to an increase in market power and results in higher prices, lower quality of green products and less green innovation. A merger may also result in an increase in buyer power which in turn may enable a company to lower the prices at which it purchases certain products or materials. This can disincentivise investment into such products due to an expected decrease in revenues.[34] Furthermore, mergers that unilaterally affect the amount and pace of innovation through path dependency may lead to a loss in the future green competition.[35] In Dow/DuDupont, the European Commission found that the two companies were close R&D competitors, and a merger may result in the discontinuation of overlapping innovation efforts. Since rivals were not deemed likely to counteract such effects, the clearance was conditional on “R&D asset divestiture remedies”.[36]

A potential scenario that may arise is an increase in price due to a buyer acquiring a close competitor where each party has complementary technologies and know-how that in the long run can lead to significant green innovation.[37] In such a case, the regulator would consider green efficiencies. The CMA recognises environmental sustainability and support for a low carbon economy transition as potential efficiencies, although it stresses that facts of individual cases are important in the assessment.[38]

When investigating mergers between enterprises in the UK, the CMA may opt to not find a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) in a merger in cases where rivalry-enhancing efficiencies, for instance, environmental benefits, are outweighed by anticompetitive effects.[39] Similarly, there may be ‘relevant customer benefits’ (RCBs) that although lead to an SLC, the CMA may opt to consider remedies that preserve RCBs or may decide that RCBs outweigh adverse SLC effects and no referral to an in-depth review phase is needed.[40]

The CMA has identified three key areas where the UK’s net zero and sustainability goals may influence the mergers. Firms directly involved in climate-related activities may merge and lessen competition in this area. Alternatively, mergers may enhance efficiency, for example by creating more efficient sustainable production processes. A merger may also result in RCBs that support the net zero transition. [41]

The CMA recognises, however, that quantifying efficiency or RCB relating to environmental sustainability may be challenging or even infeasible.[42] Moreover, weighing up exercises may involve value judgments between sustainability and competition outcomes.[43] There is no established framework to render value judgments in relation to environmental sustainability, and there is no independent body that the CMA could consult in this regard. Finally, it may further be challenging to see a claimed environmental benefit if a firm argues that the merger is needed to scale and scope its operations to achieve green objectives. The CMA would have to be satisfied that no other less anti-competitive alternative is available.[44]

It is important to note that under section 58 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02) the Secretary of State can intervene in mergers cases on grounds of public interest, but environmental considerations would need to be specified as a public interest consideration.[45]

Markets regime

The CMA has the power to carry out market studies and investigation references (MIRs) and can implement a number of remedies accordingly.[46] Such tools are set out in the Enterprise Act (EA02) (amended by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013).[47] The key goal of such tools is to examine and remedy any economic harms that arise to consumers because of poor competition. The CMA considers that under the current markets regime it can take into account environmental sustainability if it implicates harm to consumers.[48]

In 2020, the CMA launched  a market study into electric vehicle charging and has considered launching a CA98 investigation into ‘long-term exclusivity arrangements for charging along motorways’ among others.[49] Some note that MIRs may be one of the most flexible tools in the CMA’s toolbox to determine appropriate course of action since CMA can make orders, accept undertakings, as well as use its consumer protection powers and make recommendations for remedial action to the government, regulators or other public authorities.[50] The CMA is considering strengthening the markets regime by increasing the speed and effectiveness of its market tools, especially in the context of fast-paced developing environmental and sustainability markets.[51]

Consumer regime

As part of its consumer protection role, the CMA has been dedicating attention to addressing and preventing misleading environmental claims by companies. In September 2021, the CMA published specific guidance to help businesses comply with the relevant obligations with regards to environmental claims.[52] Although green claims provisions are mostly aimed at preventing misleading claims that could lead to erosion of consumers’ trust, it is also a signal that the CMA will aim to ensure a level playing field by protecting businesses from unfair competition.[53] The CMA global review found that 40% of firms’ green claims may be misleading.[54] It began carrying out a review of misleading green claims in early 2022, starting with the fashion sector.[55] The CMA is further co-leading a project to tackle misleading green claims online.[56]

There are several potential challenges under the current regime. For instance, at the moment, there is no standard definition of environmental terms such as ‘biodegradable’, compostable, ‘carbon neutral’, ‘carbon negative’, and ‘net zero’. The CMA recognises, however, that definitions would promote product comparability and help consumers make informed decisions, as well as create a level playing field for businesses.[57] Moreover, while at present there is an obligation further down the supply chain to not mislead businesses to whom goods and services are sold, there is no positive obligation to disclose information.[58] Finally, while it is currently entirely legitimate to employ marketing tools that aim to increase consumption, such practices may be re-examined should the UK try to shift its patterns of consumption in order to meet sustainability goals.[59] The CMA has recommended that the UK introduce changes to the existing consumer law and implement the following: “i) Disclosure of environmental sustainability information ii) Supply chain transparency, iii) Changes to the list of banned practices under consumer law to deter use and support enforcement of misleading and unsubstantiated environmental claims, iv) Strengthening the CMA’s enforcement powers and refocusing consumer law to support sustainable consumption”.[60]

How competition law can help to address climate change

Competition law can be a driver of the fight against climate change in many ways. Investing in green initiatives can secure companies a competitive advantage, cut their costs, increase their market shares and spur innovation.[61] At the same time, competition regulations may improve product quality, choice of more sustainable products, and stimulate green innovation while addressing market failures.[62]

Self-imposed targets by businesses and individuals are influential, however, the consensus is that ambitious goals require cooperation among companies including joining assets and know-how via mergers and joint ventures.[63] As such, robust legal frameworks are crucial as is clarity when it comes to weighing in when any such cooperation is within the permitted boundaries. Ultimately, in addition to ensuring that it does not create significant barriers to the net zero transition, competition law can help to avoid anticompetitive practices that may negatively impact climate efforts, and facilitate cooperation between businesses on climate change.

The CMA has already produced relevant guidance that can help firms navigate the risks and opportunities in this area, and will likely continue to do so.  More initiatives are being further launched by CMA. In 2022, CMA launched a Sustainability Taskforce to lead the efforts in supporting the UK’s transition to a low carbon economy.[64] Its tasks include engaging with the relevant stakeholders, partner organisations and the government as well as develop formal sustainability guidance across CMA’s functions, periodically review cases for legislative change and similar.[65] Market studies as carried out by the CMA are and will continue to be a crucial tool in analysing the entire market, making effective recommendations to the government and implementing needed remedies.

Future reforms may involve more directly integrating climate change into CMA decision making, as has been proposed for other regulators. While some judicial reviews aiming to hold the government to account on climate commitments have succeeded, scholars note there is nothing to suggest this trend may spill over into competition law.[66] To that end, some have proposed specifying “climate change and sustainability” as a public interest under Sections 58 and 153 of EA02.[67] These steps would fall in line with the broader trend of integrating climate change across all government bodies explored in other sections of this resource.

[1] Wolftheiss. What Role Can Competition Law play in tackling climate change? 15 July 2020, https://www.wolftheiss.com/insights/what-role-can-competition-law-play-in-tackling-climate-change/

[2] Holmes, pp. 355 (Ref: Holmes, Simon. “Climate change, sustainability, and competition law.” Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 8, no. 2 (2020): 354-405.)

[3] CMA Annual Plan 2020-2021 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/competition-and-markets-authority-annual-plan-2020-to-2021/annual-plan-2020-to-2021

[4] CMA Annual Plan 2022-2023 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/competition-and-markets-authority-annual-plan-2022-to-2023/annual-plan-2022-to-2023

[5] Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2021)4/en/pdf 1 December 2021   

[6] Ibid., para 97

[7] See Competition law clarity needed to encourage sustainable business practices OUT-LAW ANALYSIS | 10 Dec 2020 https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/analysis/competition-law-clarity-encourage-sustainable-business-practices

[8] OECD 2021, para 100 (Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2021)4/en/pdf 1 December 2021)

[9] Ibid. para 101.

[10] European Commission, Press release, July 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3581

[11] Standardisation agreements can be used to meet environmental objectives which would otherwise be challenging due to the first-mover disadvantage. For a case law example, see the Chicken of Tomorrow case where the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) found that an agreement between chicken meat producers and retailers which constituted a combined 95% market share to only produce and sell chicken with higher sustainability standards would restrict choice for consumers, and other, less restrictive forms of increasing the sale of sustainably produced chicken were available.

[12] For example, see the CECED case where the parties to the agreement, with a combined 90% of the market share, agreed to improve the energy efficiency of washing machines in the European market. The European Commission found that the benefits outweighed the harm and no less restrictive alternative could apply. (ref: OECD 2021, para 117: https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2021)4/en/pdf). On the other hand, in September 2019, the US DoJ opened an investigation into automakers that struck a vehicle emissions deal in order to increase fuel efficiency and reduce average emissions that would go below the national emissions standard. In February 2020, the DoJ closed the investigation finding no laws were broken, see https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/climate/trump-california-automakers-antitrust.html

[13] Such agreements are useful in overcoming coordination problems and may include certifications, networks or other cost sharing schemes when setting up new environmental initiatives between participants (see OECD 2021, para 122 https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2021)4/en/pdf).

[14] Dolmans and Mostyn, 2021 in OECD 2021, para 140  https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2021)4/en/pdf.

[15] OECD 2021, para 143  https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2021)4/en/pdf.

[16] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs,  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1021364/CFI_-_sustainability_advice_.pdf

[17] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs,  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1021364/CFI_-_sustainability_advice_.pdf

[18] For a summary of conditions see  Environmental sustainability agreements and competition law.

[19] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs,  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1021364/CFI_-_sustainability_advice_.pdf , para 21

[20] Ibid., para 22

[21] CMA (2022). Environmental sustainability and the UK competition and consumer regimes: CMA advice to the Government Published 14 March 2022 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-sustainability-and-the-uk-competition-and-consumer-regimes-cma-advice-to-the-government/environmental-sustainability-and-the-uk-competition-and-consumer-regimes-cma-advice-to-the-government#fn:16

[22] Ibid.

[23] See Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd and others v Mastercard Incorporated and others, [2002] UKSC 24,

[24] CMA (2022). Environmental sustainability and the UK competition and consumer regimes: CMA advice to the Government Published 14 March 2022 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-sustainability-and-the-uk-competition-and-consumer-regimes-cma-advice-to-the-government/environmental-sustainability-and-the-uk-competition-and-consumer-regimes-cma-advice-to-the-government#fn:16

[25] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs,  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1021364/CFI_-_sustainability_advice_.pdf , para 20

[26] Ibid. para 24

[27] Ibid.

[28] Holmes, section 3.d, Working paper – CCLP(L)51 CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABILITY AND COMPETITION LAW IN THE UK Simon Holmes1 (OXFORD)

[29] See OECD 2021, para 126

[30] See CMA’s Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Order, 12 July 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1091830/VABEO_Guidance.pdf

[31] Squire Patton Boggs, New EU and UK Rules for Vertical Agreements Come Into Effect 1 June 2022 Summary of Key Changes EMEA – 1 June 2022 https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2022/06/new-eu-and-uk-rules-for-vertical-agreements-come-into-effect-1-june-2022/new-eu-and-uk-rules-for-vertical-agreements-come-into-effect-1-june-2022.pdf  

[32] Repsol. “Reposol Buys Viesgo’s Low-Emissions Assets and Retail Business for 750 Million Euros”. 27 June 2018. https://www.repsol.com/content/dam/repsol-corporate/en_gb/sala-de-prensa/documentos-sala-de-prensa/np27062018_repsol_buys_viesgos_low_emissions_assets_tcm14-134187.pdf

[33] OECD, para 148. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2021)4/en/pdf  Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat  1 December 2021  

[34] See 2020 Arubis/Metallo case where the EC approved the acquisition by Arubis having considered mentioned concerns.

[35] [35] OECD, para 162. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2021)4/en/pdf  Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat  1 December 2021  

[36] OECD, Ibid. para 166

[37] OECD, Ibid. para 171

[38] CMA, Merger Assessment Guidelines, 18 March 2021 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1051823/MAGs_for_publication_2021_–_.pdf

[39] Ibid. para 30

[40] Ibid. para 31

[41] Ibid. para 33-35

[42] Ibid. para 36

[43] Ibid. para 37

[44] Ibid. para 32

[45] CMA, Environmental sustainability and the UK competition and consumer regimes: CMA advice to the Government Published 14 March 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-sustainability-and-the-uk-competition-and-consumer-regimes-cma-advice-to-the-government/environmental-sustainability-and-the-uk-competition-and-consumer-regimes-cma-advice-to-the-government#fn:16

[46] Working paper – CCLP(L)51 CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABILITY AND COMPETITION LAW IN THE UK Simon Holmes1 (OXFORD)

[47] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs,  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1021364/CFI_-_sustainability_advice_.pdf Para 71

[48] Ibid., 79

[49] Ibid. para 77-78

[50] Working paper – CCLP(L)51 CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABILITY AND COMPETITION LAW IN THE UK Simon Holmes1 (OXFORD), section 6c

[51] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs,  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1021364/CFI_-_sustainability_advice_.pdf Para 80

[52] CMA guidance on environmental claims on goods and services: Helping businesses comply with their consumer protection law obligations, 20 September 2021, CMA 146 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1018820/Guidance_for_businesses_on_making_environmental_claims_.pdf

[53] Malinauskaite 2022, pp 348. Source: Jurgita Malinauskaite, Competition Law and Sustainability: EU and National Perspectives, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 13, Issue 5, July 2022, Pages 336–348, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpac003

[54] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/global-sweep-finds-40-of-firms-green-claims-could-be-misleading Press release; Jan 2021 

[55] CMA Annual Plan 2022-2023 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/competition-and-markets-authority-annual-plan-2022-to-2023/annual-plan-2022-to-2023 

[56] Malinauskaite 2022, pp 348

[57] CMA (2021), Environmental Sustainability and the Competition and Consumer Law Regimes – Advice to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy – Call for inputs,   https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1021364/CFI_-_sustainability_advice_.pdf para 53

[58] Ibid. para 58

[59] Ibid. paras 68-69

[60] CMA 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-sustainability-and-the-uk-competition-and-consumer-regimes-cma-advice-to-the-government/environmental-sustainability-and-the-uk-competition-and-consumer-regimes-cma-advice-to-the-government#fn:16 Correspondence Environmental sustainability and the UK competition and consumer regimes: CMA advice to the Government Published 14 March 2022

[61] OECD. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2021)4/en/pdf Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat  1 December 2021  

[62] Ibid. para 21

[63] ICC, 2020; Holmes, 2020; Dolmans, 2020; Unilever, 2020 in OECD 2021 (https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2021)4/en/pdf Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement Background Paper by the Secretariat  1 December 2021)

[64] CMA “CMA publishes environmental sustainability advice to government”, Press Release, 14 March 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-publishes-environmental-sustainability-advice-to-government 

[65] CMA. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-sustainability-and-the-uk-competition-and-consumer-regimes-cma-advice-to-the-government/environmental-sustainability-and-the-uk-competition-and-consumer-regimes-cma-advice-to-the-government#fn:16 Correspondence Environmental sustainability and the UK competition and consumer regimes: CMA advice to the Government Published 14 March 2022

[66] Holmes, section 3.2c, Working paper – CCLP(L)51 CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABILITY AND COMPETITION LAW IN THE UK Simon Holmes1 (Oxford)

[67] Ibid. section 7