Brazil

Climate Change Litigation

Executive summary

In Brazil, climate change litigation has expanded rapidly over the last five years (2020-2025), evolving from isolated cases into a structured strategy to influence public governance and, increasingly, corporate behavior. Due to this growth, researchers argue that climate litigation ” has already become an autonomous discipline thanks to a talented and dynamic new doctrine.[1]

Researchers mapping the field emphasize that, so far, most of Brazilian cases are usually framed to produce systemic effects, which means lawsuits aiming at compelling agencies, or the government, to implement policies, unlock funding, or adjust enforcement-rather than seeking only individual remedies. This trajectory mirrors global trends identified by the Grantham Research Institute, which documents the rise of strategic climate cases worldwide since 2020, with almost 60% of cases recorded in the Global South, since 2020.[2] The same study highlights that, in the Global South, governments, regulatory agencies and district attorneys are playing a key role in climate litigation developments. In the Global South in 2024, 56% of cases were initiated by government bodies. This distinguishes Brazil from countries like the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, where the government is rarely a claimant in such cases.[3] In contrast to some jurisdictions, a wide range of entities in Brazil may have standing to bring climate litigation. The center of gravity remains public-law litigation, often tied to land-use and deforestation enforcement.

In Brazil, climate litigation is supported by a robust constitutional provision that states that everyone has the right to a balanced environment.[4] Likewise, it is recognized for having a strong environmental system, with numerous regulatory agencies at all levels of the federation (municipal, state and federal), with strong action at the federal level by the Brazilian environmental agency-alike government department, which is the Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA). IBAMA has been filing Public Civil Actions (a type of Brazilian class action) seeking compensation for environmental and climate damages arising out of illegal deforestation.[5] 

Brazil also has a consistently high volume of climate litigation, ranking amongst the highest internationally. As of July 2025,[6] Brazil placed fourth globally-behind the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, with national trackers recording around 135 cases by July 2025, maintaining the steeper curve initiated in 2023. This shows that the country, thanks to strong legal protection and a firm jurisprudential construction of environmental protection, is a fertile environment for discussions about climate change, although it is still in its infancy when it comes to enforcing judgments and achieving climate justice.

It is important to note that climate litigation is a distinct phenomenon which, while related to traditional environmental litigation, brings a unique set of challenges and opportunities. Perhaps the most difficult of these challenges is that climate change is an issue caused by countless different entities, with a wide array of negative impacts which are spread across the entire world and over multiple decades. For certain types of litigation, climate change’s vast physical and temporal scale can make fundamental tasks such as establishing causation or calculating damages significantly more difficult than most environmental litigation. On the other hand, climate litigation extends far beyond environmental law – climate change’s systemic nature provides the impetus for litigation across a diverse range of legal areas, many of which are explored in this resource. This diversity means that climate litigation does not always address environmental impacts directly. It may, for example, consider how climate change manifests as financial risk, or how businesses’ representations about climate change might amount to misrepresentations.

How climate change is impacting litigation

Strong Roles for the Federal District Attorney’s Office (MPF), IBAMA and NGOs

The current surge is rooted in the institutional capacity of district attorneys and environmental agencies, coupled with NGOs’ increasingly sophisticated legal strategies. JUMA’s dataset and independent analyses show this triad driving case initiation and shaping remedies-from injunctions to structural orders.[7] Notably, in 2023 civil society organizations matched district attorneys in new filings for the first time, signaling a diversification of plaintiffs and theories. Now, the number of filings is led by government bodies, followed by the district attorney’s office and NGOs.  

Within this actor mix, IBAMA features prominently, whether as an enforcer whose actions are defended in court or as a party in litigation to compel oversight. Case clusters linked to illegal deforestation and fires in the Amazon often involve joint efforts by MPF and IBAMA, with courts ordering restoration, penalties, and, increasingly, recognition of the climate dimension of environmental damage, including awards for climate damages. These cases provide crucial building blocks for climate accountability even when not specifically framed as standalone “climate torts”.

 At the same time, NGOs have broadened the litigation agenda beyond land use, challenging public biddings or projects with high emissions profiles, pressing for transparency and climate-aligned due diligence, and exploring consumer-protection angles around green claims. While outcomes vary – and no decision has been handed down so far effectively generating climate justice – these suits reinforce the message that climate considerations are not peripheral but integral to administrative legality and corporate governance.

For practitioners, one implication is procedural: these cases often entail complex evidence, from satellite deforestation data to emissions baselines and climate risk modeling. Familiarity with the methodologies referenced in Brazil’s climate policy instruments (e.g., National Policy on Climate Change – PNMC – documents, sectoral plans under the Plano Clima) can be outcome-determinative.

Strategic use of lawsuits to press public policy and strengthen oversight

Brazil’s “boom” is not simply a matter of more filings; it is the strategic design of claims that stands out. Plaintiffs aim to unlock budgetary flows (e.g., climate funds), compel the implementation of long-standing programs, and embed climate criteria into administrative procedures. Although it has been increasing in recent years, the implementation of public policies in compliance with these criteria depends on specific regulations, either by the Executive Branch or by the Legislative Branch, depending on the sphere of competence, which can delay concrete implementation.

Strengthening oversight is the second pillar of these strategies. Actions often seek to recalibrate federal-state responsibilities, clarify the scope of agencies’ duties, and ensure that monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) are meaningful rather than formalistic.  Litigation thus becomes a tool to “stress-test” institutions and identify gaps that require legislative or administrative intervention. 

It is equally important to recognize limits: despite policy-level wins, so far there has not been a court decision imposing direct emission-reduction mandates on private defendants, and pure climate-damage claims.  Indeed, climate law and policy as a whole is still a fast-moving area – Brazil only set a country-wide cap on emissions for its regulated carbon market in 2024. While Brazil is at the forefront of climate litigation, receiving the third highest number of cases of any jurisdiction as of September 2025, climate litigation remains an emerging and arguably even embryonic concept.  The Judiciary is still looking into the applicability of the theses and legal grounds brought by the parties. However, the Supreme Court has laid important foundations which help frame climate cases, for example by stating that the Paris Agreement is a human rights treaty and therefore hierarchically superior to ordinary laws. The most successful suits produce indirect emission effects through better enforcement (e.g. reduced illegal deforestation[8]) or procedural improvements (e.g. climate criteria in licensing[9]), rather than through company-specific abatement orders. This realistic appraisal may impact business expectations and shape risk management appropriately.  

Finally, the timeline of impacts matters. Even when plaintiffs prevail, court-ordered results often depend on subsequent administrative planning, inter-ministerial coordination, and budget cycles. Decisions by the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) – while  not positive – frequently require implementation of existing regulations, revised plans, and oversight by audit institutions.

Civil and criminal actions against illegal deforestation and fires in the Amazon

The most voluminous cluster of Brazilian climate litigation is tethered to illegal deforestation and burning across Amazonian frontiers. Brazilian mapping[10] and global snapshots[11] indicate that a large share of Brazil’s climate cases sit in the land-use/deforestation space, especially in Amazon jurisdictions.[12] Public civil actions spearheaded by Federal District Attorney frequently seek restoration, compensation, and injunctions against further harm, articulating the climate dimension of damage within broader environmental claims. This strategy appears both in systemic suits (targeting policy/enforcement failures) and in dozens of individual liability suits that monetize climate harm (e.g., via social cost-of-carbon) alongside classic environmental remedies. The “PAE Antimary case” series[13] exemplifies this approach, with multiple cases treating climate harm as part of the compensable injury from unlawful clearing.

The emphasis on land-use cases is not only incidental. Land-use change is a leading source of Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions[14], so enforcing existing forest laws yields substantial mitigation co-benefits. Courts, in turn, are receptive to arguments that integrate climate science with classic environmental doctrines (e.g.: polluter pays, prevention and precaution), enabling remedies that resonate with both conservation and climate objectives. This legal synergy explains why deforestation enforcement remains the workhorse of Brazil’s climate docket.

On the other hand, in the criminal sphere, there is a growing trend to frame the gravity of environmental offenses through their climate implications. Although Brazilian criminal law still does not recognize autonomous climate crimes, prosecutors increasingly invoke greenhouse gas emissions and associated climate risks to underscore the heightened social harm of such conduct. This framing influences sentencing by informing the assessment of culpability and the proportionality of penalties, while also shaping the negotiation of plea agreements and the design of restorative obligations, which now frequently include reforestation measures and compensation calculated on the basis of emissions. Furthermore, it drives evidentiary innovation, with greater reliance on geospatial monitoring and emissions estimation methodologies, thereby integrating climate science into criminal adjudication and reinforcing the preventive and deterrent functions of environmental criminal law.

For companies working near forest frontiers or in sectors exposed to land-use supply chains (agribusiness, logistics, finance), the litigation signal is clear: due diligence on deforestation risk is fast becoming a legal baseline, not a voluntary ESG add-on. Monitoring legal reserves, CAR/CRA registries, and third-party land claims-and auditing supplier practices-can materially mitigate exposure to both public and private claims. Additionally, understanding the role and rights of traditional and indigenous communities is also critical. While these structural aspects should, in principle, fall under the State’s responsibility, Brazil faces a persistent governance gap in this area, which ultimately shifts significant compliance and engagement burdens onto developers seeking to operate in these regions.

A second thematic front is the incorporation of climate impact analysis into environmental licensing for large projects – which has not yet been implemented through federal legislation, being limited to judicial pleadings. Plaintiffs have sought injunctions or merits rulings to require climate-specific baselines (e.g., greenhouse gas inventories) and mitigation/compensation plans as conditions to license issuance or renewal. Courts have, in some isolated and very punctual instances, ordered agencies to add climate directives to licensing references-especially for high-emitting sectors like thermal power[15] -signaling that climate is not merely a contextual factor.

Still, the caselaw remains nascent. There are few decisions suspending licenses exclusively for lack of a climate assessment; most outcomes so far blend climate with other environmental or social impact concerns. This is consistent with broader administrative law: courts are cautious about halting complex projects without robust, project-specific evidence that the omission of climate analysis would cause irreparable harm or violate a clear legal duty. In this scenario, one can conclude that the realization of climate justice would be best achieved through legislative and regulatory changes, so that in Brazil the issue is still in its infancy.

Notwithstanding, as a good practice, developers that front-load climate materiality – by quantifying greenhouse gas emissions, disclosing climate risks, and proposing mitigation – are better positioned to withstand judicial scrutiny in the coming future. In parallel, regulatory agencies that issue technical guidelines for climate in EIA/RIMA can reduce litigation by clarifying expectations ex ante.

Approval of the Council of Federal Justice’s climate statements

In November 2024, Brazil’s Council of Federal Justice (CJF), a department affiliated with the Federal Courts, responsible for oversight, proposing guidance and legal studies,approved 103 climate and environmental statements at its first national workshop on environmental crisis prevention and management. These texts synthesize expert discussions and aim to provide orientation to judges and practitioners. Statement 31[16] is particularly relevant: it recommends that large projects be subject to climate impact studies with greenhouse gas diagnostics to inform mitigation and risk management. While not binding, these statements crystallize best-practice expectations that can reverberate in judicial reasoning.

It is important, however, not to conflate statements with caselaw. These are academic-normative guides rather than precedential rulings and have no binding force on courts or agencies. Its persuasive value will depend on how credibly they integrate with existing statutes, regulations, and the factual record of each case. Courts may cite them as soft law references, but enforceability rests on concrete legal duties already embedded in environmental and climate policy frameworks.

Ultimately, the testing ground for the statements will be real disputes over major energy, mining, and transport projects. So far, considering that they were approved at the end of 2024, there are no judgments that cite the statements recently approved by the CJF, especially Statement 31.

The Role of the Brazilian Supreme Court

As a Constitutional Court, the STF is increasingly analyzing climate cases. The number is growing considering that 19 climate-related cases reached the STF between 2015 and 2024, with 63% resulting in outcomes favorable to plaintiffs.[17] Many of these concerned land-use and deforestation, reflecting the Brazilian docket’s focus and the Court’s role in balizar constitutional duties among federal and state actors. This success rate matters strategically: it signals that well-framed climate claims can prevail at the apex level even if the issues addressed are still in a stage of development and maturation.

In 2022, the STF judged the Action for Breach of a Fundamental Principle (ADPF) No. 708, at which time the court prohibited the contingency of the National Climate Fund and ordered the federal government to ensure its effective operation, finding unconstitutionality in the government’s omission in 2019-2020. The decision carried broader doctrinal weight: opinions by Justices Barroso and Fachin treated environmental treaties, including the Paris Agreement, as enjoying supralegal status akin to human rights instruments-fortifying the judiciary’s scrutiny of climate governance failures. 

This ruling is frequently cited as a cornerstone of Brazilian climate caselaw because it links international commitments with domestic enforceability. By reading the PNMC (National Policy on Climate Change, a statutory Federal Law) and climate funds through this rights-based lens, the Court established that budgetary and administrative discretion is not limitless where climate protection is at stake. Beyond doctrine, the case had operational implications: it compelled the government to approve annual allocation plans for the Fund and to disburse resources across mitigation and adaptation lines, with oversight by development banks and environment ministries. This demonstrates how structural rulings for climate change can re-activate dormant instruments and catalyze cross-agency coordination, while creating measurable benchmarks for subsequent audits and follow-up litigation.

How climate litigation can help to address climate change

Climate Plan 2025 (update to the National Policy on Climate Change)

The “Climate Plan”[18] is the federal government’s overarching blueprint for climate action to 2035, integrating mitigation and adaptation pillars, crosscutting strategies, and sectoral plans. It also underpinned Brazil’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement, informing targets and trajectories and guiding the inter-ministerial committee’s coordination across 20+ ministries. The Climate Plan is currently going through a review, and the Brazilian Government expects to release its new version at COP30.

In July 2025, the government released the National Mitigation Strategy (ENM) and seven sectoral plans (public lands, agriculture, industry, transport, cities, waste, and energy) for consultation, detailing actions, indicators, and financing avenues. This package is the operational heart of the Climate Plan’s mitigation axis and is designed to be iterative, enabling adjustments based on MRV feedback and evolving international commitments.

Law No. 14,904/2024 (framework for climate adaptation plans)

Enacted on June 27, 2024, Federal Law No. 14,904/2024 establishes general rules for drafting climate adaptation plans at all levels of government. It codifies principles for climate-risk governance-risk identification, prioritization, integration with existing sectoral policies, and continuous monitoring-embedding adaptation within Brazil’s PNMC architecture. The law also emphasizes financing mechanisms, including potential support from the National Climate Fund.

From a litigation standpoint, the statute creates verifiable benchmarks: jurisdictions must conduct climate-risk analyses, set priorities based on vulnerability, and mainstream adaptation into development strategies. Where authorities fail to meet these duties, litigants can seek mandamus-style remedies or structural orders to compel plan issuance and implementation. This is consistent with Brazilian courts’ readiness to require minimum performance on environmental rights.

The law also supports fiscal accountability and transparency by requiring plans to be publicly available and periodically updated. This creates evidentiary trails that litigants and auditors can leverage, strengthening the feedback loop between policy planning and judicial oversight. In practice, it may reduce the information asymmetries that often hamper climate litigation.

The Brazilian Emissions Trading System (SBCE)

The Federal Law No. 15,042/2024 establishes the Brazilian Emissions Trading System (SBCE), introducing a cap-and-trade architecture with regulated and voluntary segments. Covered operators above defined emissions thresholds must monitor, report, and reconcile emissions with allowances or certified reductions (CRVEs). The law also creates a governing body – which is still in the creation phase -, to set rules verify compliance, and impose sanctions, while clarifying sectoral scope (e.g., primary agriculture excluded as a regulated activity). 

Legally, the SBCE anchors MRV obligations and creates justiciable duties for covered entities-failure to report accurately or reconcile emissions can trigger penalties. It also provides a statutory framework for integrating offsets and removals subject to registration, thereby structuring a compliance-grade role for carbon projects. This enhances the enforceability of climate targets and complements litigation by moving from programmatic to operational obligations.

For companies, the SBCE shifts climate risk from reputational to regulatory. Companies should prioritize readiness assessments, inventorying emissions, validating baselines, and stress-testing abatement pathways under allowance scenarios. Interactions with licensing (e.g., climate mitigation conditions) and with consumer-protection law (green claims) may also intensify as MRV data becomes more visible.

PL No. 3,614/2024 (recognition of a climate emergency; pending in the Senate-approved by the Infrastructure Committee, currently with the Environment Committee)

Bill No. 3,614/2024 proposes to amend the PNMC to recognize a climate emergency, set new objectives (including resilient infrastructure), and create a National Climate Emergency Plan. In June 2025, the Senate’s Infrastructure Committee approved a report with amendments; the bill now awaits rapporteur designation in the Environment Committee in a terminative procedure. The legislative movement reflects a desire to mainstream emergency logic into planning and investment decisions. 

If enacted, the bill could sharpen judicial standards by defining emergency thresholds and priorities, thus making it easier to argue that administrative delay or dilution violates statutory duties. It would also facilitate the alignment of budgetary and procurement instruments with climate resilience, potentially reducing litigation rooted in under-investment or maladaptation.

ClimaBrasil Panel (developed by the Federal Court of Accounts to monitor and evaluate government climate action)

The Painel ClimaBrasil, launched by Brazil’s Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) in February 2025, is a nationwide tool to evaluate climate governance across federal, state, and municipal levels. Adapted from the international ClimateScanner initiative led by the TCU within the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), the panel assesses governance, public policies, and financing, with consolidated results slated for COP30. This audit-driven perspective can inject accountability and data discipline into climate policy.

ClimaBrasil also promotes horizontal learning among state and municipal governments, potentially harmonizing climate indicators and administrative good practices. This can lower the variance that often fuels litigation, where different jurisdictions adopt inconsistent standards for similar risks. Greater policy coherence can thus reduce disputes over arbitrariness or unequal treatment. For the private sector, increased transparency about public policy gaps or progress informs risk assessments for long-term investments, particularly in infrastructure and urban development.  

Resources for Practitioners

The evolving landscape of climate change litigation in Brazil demonstrates that this field is advancing rapidly and is poised for continued growth, supported by a robust legislative and regulatory framework and active engagement by government authorities.

For those seeking deeper insights and comprehensive analyses of Brazil’s climate litigation trends, key resources include JUMA-PUC Rio and JusClima2030.

[1] Wedy, Gabriel and Wolfgang Sarlet, Ingo and Pimentel, Cacia and Fensterseifer, Tiago. Climate Litigation in Brazil. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network (July 31, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5374993

[2] Setzer, Joana; Higham, Catherine. Global Trends in Climate Change Litigation 2025 Snapshot. London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2025. Available at: https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Global-Trends-in-Climate-Change-Litigation-2025-Snapshot.pdf

[3] Id.

[4] Brazil. Brazilian Federal Constitution. Article 225. Everyone has the right to an ecologically balanced environment, which is a common good of the people and essential to a healthy quality of life, and it is incumbent upon the Government and the community to defend and preserve it for present and future generations. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm

[5] See Public Civil Action No. 1001659-42.2018.4.01.4200 (IBAMA vs. Madelin Madeireira Linhares Ltda. – Infringement notice for illegal wood storage without an environmental license and climate damage for deforestation) and Public Civil Action No. 1037196-19.2023.4.01.3200 (IBAMA vs. Dirceu Kruger – Illegal deforestation in the Amazon and climate damage).

[6] Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. Climate Change Litigation Databases. Columbia Law School (July 2025). Available at: https://climatecasechart.com/

[7] Moreira, Danielle de Andrade; Garrido, Carolina Figueiredo; Pinto, Paula Máximo de Barros; and Lima, Letícia Maria Rêgo Teixeira. Brazilian Climate Litigation Bulletin 2024. Rio de Janeiro: JUMA?PUC-Rio, 2024. Available at: https://juma.jur.puc-rio.br/post/boletim-da-litig%C3%A2ncia-clim%C3%A1tica-no-brasil-2024

[8] See Argument for Failure to Comply with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF) No. 760 and Direct Action for Unconstitutionality by Omission (ADO) No. 54 (Rede Sustentabilidade vs União – In March 2024, the Federal Supreme Court ordered the federal government to draw up and implement a plan to reduce deforestation in the Legal Amazon, with annual targets (3,925 km by 2027 and zero by 2030), monitoring and structural measures to prevent and combat fires).

[9] See the decision of the 9th Federal Court of Porto Alegre in case no. 5040314-16.2021.4.04.0000 (MPF vs IBAMA and Copelmi Mineração Ltda – On 01/09/2021, a first instance decision was handed down ordering the inclusion of climate guidelines in the Terms of Reference based on the National Climate Change Policy and the Gaucho Climate Change Policy. Although the decision was overturned at second instance on October 24, 2021, it remains emblematic for actions involving climate change litigation).

[10] Supra note 7.

[11] Supra note 2.

[12] See Public Civil Action No. 1022845-12.2021.4.01.3200 (Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office vs. Nilma Félix – Federal Court ordered full restoration of the degraded area, execution of PRAD, prohibition of use, compensation for climate damage (based on CO₂ emissions) and collective moral damages; Public Civil Action No. 1037196-19.2023.4.01.3200 (Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office v. Daniel Ferreira Matias – Judgment ordered recovery of the deforested area, implementation of PRAD, compensation for climate damage and collective moral damages); Public Civil Action No. 1015025-39.2021.4.01.3200 (Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office vs. José Francisco Pinheiro da Silva – Ordered to restore the degraded area, present PRAD, pay compensation for climate damage and collective moral damages); and Public Civil Action No. 1030936-23.2023.4.01.3200 (Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office vs. Joel de Souza – Decision ordered restoration of the area, implementation of PRAD, compensation for climate damage and a ban on further suppression).

[13] PAE Antimary cluster (set of judgments, 2024): the 7th Federal Environmental & Agrarian Court (Amazonas) issued a four of merits decisions against Nilma Félix, Daniel Ferreira Matias, José Francisco Pinheiro da Silva, and Joel de Souza, ordering full restoration, PRAD, prohibition of further use, climate-damage compensation (CO₂-based), and collective moral damages for 596.06 ha illegally cleared in total. They were ordered to pay BRL 10,265,078.44 for climate-damage compensation and BRL 1,612,910.00 for collective moral damages.

[14] Supra note 2.

[15] See Public Civil Action No. 5030786-95.2021.4.04.7100 (Instituto Preservar, Instituto Gaúcho de Estudos Ambientais – INGÁ, COONATERRA – Bionatur, CEPPA and AGAPAN vs. Copelmi Mineração Ltda, IBAMA, Energias da Campanha Ltda. and the Federal Government) – The Federal Court ordered the inclusion, in the Terms of Reference for licensing thermal power plants in RS, of the guidelines of the National Policy on Climate Change (Federal Law No. 12,187/09) and the Gaucho Policy on Climate Change (State Law No. 13,594/10), as well as the carrying out of a Strategic Environmental Assessment and analysis of risks to human health, in addition to the suspension of the Nova Seival TPP licensing process until the defects in the EIA/RIMA are corrected.

[16] Statement 31: “Large projects must undergo a climate impact study, with a view to diagnosing greenhouse gas emissions, as a necessary measure for identifying the damage and risks associated with the climate crisis, as well as for the appropriate imposition of mitigation and compensation measures” (art. 3, items I, II and III). 3, items I, II, III and V, c/c art. 4, item I, and art. 5, item IV, all of Federal Law No. 12.187/2010, as well as art. 2, items II and IV, and art. 3, items II and III, of Federal Law No. 14,904/2024).

[17] Supra note 2.

[18] Brazilian Climate Plan. Available at: Climate Plan – Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change